DEEP SECURITYCLOUD ASSURANCE

MULTICLOUD SECURITY ASSURANCE · DEMO

See the risk. Fund the plan. Fix the control.

A realistic demonstration of how cloud evidence becomes a board-ready posture view, a sequenced remediation roadmap and implementation-level guidance.

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PCI DSS 4.0.1HIPAAHITRUST CSFSOX ITGCISO 27001CIS Azure
EXECUTIVE POSTURE · ILLUSTRATIVE
56%Controls conclusively passed
12 open
2Critical4High3Review7Passed

EXECUTIVE DEMO DASHBOARD

Enterprise cloud risk at a glance

Exposure, business impact, delivery difficulty, ownership and progress—with technical evidence one click away.

Illustrative data: This demonstrates a client deliverable. It is not a scan of a real organization.
56%Conclusive pass rate
2Critical risks
3Evidence decisions
4Enterprise-impact changes
+18Points since baseline

Risk by control domain

Open findings concentrated in identity and network security

Identity & access
7
Network security
5
Logging & detection
4
Data & secrets
3
Workload protection
2

Open risk by severity

Material exposure is separated from documentation gaps

12
Critical2High4Medium3Low / advisory3

Posture trend across assessments

Conclusive pass rate improves as evidence gaps close

38%
Baseline
44%
Scan 2
49%
Scan 3
56%
Current

Remediation difficulty × change impact

Enterprise-wide changes receive added planning and coordination

Low impactHigh impactEnterpriseLow effort4 quick wins2 plan1 coordinateMedium2 plan3 coordinate2 governHigh1 plan2 govern3 transform

EXECUTIVE 12-MONTH ROADMAP

Security remediation program

One-year view from assessment execution. Initiative length reflects estimated coordination, dependencies and enterprise change impact.

ILLUSTRATIVE ROADMAP

From immediate risk reduction to sustained control

ImmediatePlannedStrategic
Executive outcome: critical exposure contained firstPlanning assumption: named owners and approved change windowsTarget: measurable improvement by each quarterly review

DETAILED TECHNICAL DEMO REPORT

Evidence engineers can act on

Expand a control for evidence, affected resources, exact remediation, validation, rollback guidance and authoritative references.

DEMO DATA · 8 REPRESENTATIVE CONTROLS

Technical findings & remediation

Illustrative Azure subscription and Entra tenant · Execution date: 7 September 2026

AZ-NET-001 · AzureInternet-exposed management portsnsg-prod-eastus / 3 rulesNetwork securityCriticalAction needed
Owner: Cloud PlatformTarget: 0–30 daysEffort: MediumChange impact: High

Observed evidence

Inbound rules permit 0.0.0.0/0 to TCP 22 and 3389 on production subnets.

Why it matters

Attackers can directly reach administrative services, increasing credential-attack and remote-compromise exposure.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Confirm emergency access paths and application dependencies.
  2. Action 2: Remove public SSH/RDP rules; deploy Azure Bastion or approved private access.
  3. Action 3: Restrict remaining administration to named trusted ranges and JIT windows.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Re-query effective NSG rules and verify no Internet source reaches TCP 22/3389. Test approved administrative access.

Rollback: Retain a time-limited emergency rule disabled by default; restore only through approved change control.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

CIS Azure 6.1 · PCI DSS 1.3 · ISO 27001 A.8.20 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

ENTRA-PIM-002 · Entra IDStanding privileged administrator accessGlobal Administrator / 6 active assignmentsIdentity & privileged accessCriticalAction needed
Owner: Identity & AccessTarget: 0–60 daysEffort: HighChange impact: Enterprise

Observed evidence

Six users hold permanent Global Administrator assignments; four are eligible for PIM conversion.

Why it matters

Persistent privilege expands the blast radius of compromised identities and unauthorized changes.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Confirm two protected cloud-only emergency access accounts.
  2. Action 2: Convert operational administrators from active to eligible assignments in PIM.
  3. Action 3: Require MFA, approval, justification, limited duration and notification for activation.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Export role assignments and PIM settings; confirm only emergency accounts remain permanent and test one governed activation.

Rollback: Stage role conversion in two waves and retain verified emergency access accounts during rollout.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

CIS Azure 1.1 · ISO 27001 A.5.18 · HIPAA 164.312(a) · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

ENTRA-CA-003 · Entra IDConditional Access does not fully block legacy authenticationPolicy set / legacy-auth gapIdentity & privileged accessHighAction needed
Owner: Identity & AccessTarget: 0–45 daysEffort: MediumChange impact: Enterprise

Observed evidence

No enabled policy conclusively blocks all legacy authentication client types across the tenant.

Why it matters

Legacy protocols can bypass modern authentication protections and increase password-spray exposure.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Create the recommended block-legacy-authentication policy in report-only mode.
  2. Action 2: Review sign-in impact for service accounts and replace legacy dependencies.
  3. Action 3: Exclude only emergency accounts; enable the policy after validation.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Review report-only results, then verify legacy-auth sign-ins are blocked in Entra sign-in logs.

Rollback: Return the policy to report-only while correcting a documented business dependency.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

CIS Azure 1.3 · Microsoft CSB IM-3 · ISO 27001 A.8.5 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

AZ-LOG-004 · AzureCritical-resource diagnostic logging gaps12 of 41 critical resourcesLogging & detectionHighAction needed
Owner: Security OperationsTarget: 0–60 daysEffort: MediumChange impact: High

Observed evidence

Twelve scoped resources lack diagnostic settings streaming required categories to the central Log Analytics workspace.

Why it matters

Investigations may lack the evidence needed to detect and reconstruct incidents.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Apply diagnostic-setting policy initiatives to in-scope resource types.
  2. Action 2: Route required categories to the designated Log Analytics workspace and archive where retention requires it.
  3. Action 3: Connect Azure Activity and Entra sign-in/audit sources to Sentinel or the approved SIEM.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Run a diagnostic-settings inventory and execute test events; confirm searchable records and expected retention.

Rollback: Keep existing log destinations during parallel validation; remove duplicates only after ingestion is proven.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

PCI DSS 10 · HIPAA 164.312(b) · ISO 27001 A.8.15 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

AZ-KV-005 · AzureKey Vault network and recovery controls incompletekv-prod-paymentsData & secretsHighReview needed
Owner: Application PlatformTarget: Q2Effort: MediumChange impact: Medium

Observed evidence

Public network access is enabled and purge protection was not confirmed for one production vault.

Why it matters

Broad network reachability and incomplete recovery protections increase secret exposure and destructive-change risk.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Inventory application paths and establish a private endpoint.
  2. Action 2: Restrict the vault firewall and disable public network access after connectivity testing.
  3. Action 3: Enable purge protection; document secret rotation owners and expiration monitoring.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Confirm private DNS resolution, application access, firewall state, soft-delete and purge-protection settings.

Rollback: Restore selected-network access temporarily if private routing fails; purge protection cannot be disabled after enablement.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

PCI DSS 3.6 · HITRUST 01.i · ISO 27001 A.8.24 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

AZ-STO-006 · AzureStorage transport baseline variance2 storage accountsData & secretsMediumReview needed
Owner: Cloud PlatformTarget: Q2Effort: LowChange impact: Low

Observed evidence

Two accounts require confirmation of minimum TLS 1.2, secure transfer and public network restrictions.

Why it matters

Weak transport or broad exposure could allow insecure connections or unintended data access.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Set minimum TLS to 1.2 or later and require secure transfer.
  2. Action 2: Disable anonymous blob access and restrict public network access.
  3. Action 3: Use private endpoints for regulated-data workloads.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Export storage configuration and test that HTTP and unsupported TLS requests fail.

Rollback: Use a documented compatibility exception with an expiration date if a legacy client cannot negotiate TLS 1.2.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

CIS Azure 3.1 · PCI DSS 4.2 · ISO 27001 A.8.24 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

ENTRA-PWD-007 · Entra IDPassword and authentication-method policy requires confirmationTenant authentication policyIdentity & privileged accessMediumEvidence needed
Owner: Identity & AccessTarget: Q2Effort: LowChange impact: Medium

Observed evidence

Automated evidence did not establish banned-password protection, password-protection mode, or phishing-resistant method coverage.

Why it matters

Unconfirmed authentication controls prevent management from relying on the intended identity baseline.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Review Entra password protection and authentication-method policies.
  2. Action 2: Enable banned-password protection and prefer phishing-resistant methods for privileged users.
  3. Action 3: Avoid routine password expiration unless required; force change on compromise and eliminate legacy authentication.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Export policy configuration and sample privileged-user registration coverage; record approved exceptions.

Rollback: Pilot authentication-method changes with administrators before broad enforcement.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

NIST 800-63B · Microsoft CSB IM-6 · ISO 27001 A.5.17 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗

AZ-DEF-008 · AzureDefender for Cloud coverage validatedScoped subscriptionWorkload protectionInfoPassed
Owner: Security OperationsTarget: MaintainEffort: NoneChange impact: Low

Observed evidence

Defender plans are enabled for scoped workload types and no uncovered production subscription was identified.

Why it matters

No open risk identified for this control at assessment time.

Recommended actions

  1. Action 1: Continue monthly coverage review and track high-severity recommendations to closure.

Validation & rollback

Verify: Reconfirm plan coverage and recommendation age during the next assessment.

Rollback: Not applicable.

Framework mappings & implementation reference

Microsoft CSB LT-1 · ISO 27001 A.8.16 · Open Microsoft guidance ↗